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Introduction
Climate change may dramatically damage future generations. If anthropogenic GHG emissions are among the main causes of climate change, whatever their exact relevance in the overall climatic process, it becomes necessary to identify when, where and how these emissions ought to be controlled.
Policymakers in almost all world countries are indeed discussing how to tackle the climate change problem. In the 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm, the leading industrialised nations agreed on the objective of at least halving global CO 2 emissions by 2050
1 . Such an agreement follows earlier resolutions of other countries, such as the EU, Canada and Japan. 2 Therefore, a primary research effort is to provide information on the optimal strategy -in particular in terms of energy R&D and investments in the energy sector -that different regions of the world should adopt in order to minimise the costs of achieving their own emission reduction target.
How is optimality of energy strategies defined in this context? The long-term stabilisation target is clearly a political decision. There is indeed a lot of uncertainty on the threshold temperature level and its relationship with GHG concentrations (as made clear in the last IPCC Fourth Assessment Report). Therefore, for analytical purposes, this paper considers two long term targets, both expressed in terms of carbon atmospheric concentrations. The first target is a 550 ppm (CO 2 only) concentration target. The second one stabilises emissions at 450 ppm (CO 2 only).
These two reference targets roughly coincide with IPCC Post-TAR stabilisation scenarios C and B respectively. Although the IPCC considers even more stringent emissions pathways, we resort to focus on the two that we consider more politically realistic. The first target is often advocated in the US (see for example Newell and Hall, 2007) , whereas the second one is close to the EU objective of keeping future temperature changes below 2 degrees Celsius. Optimality is then defined as the welfare maximising path of energy R&D expenditures, investments in energy technologies and direct consumption of fossil fuels consistent with the proposed stabilisation targets.
The optimal R&D and investment strategies in a given world region depend upon many factors: for example, upon the discount rate, or the investment decisions taken in other regions or countries, or the effectiveness of R&D in increasing energy efficiency, or in providing new, low carbon, energy technologies. Optimal R&D and investment strategies also depend on the expected climate damages, on the economic growth in various regions of the world, and on other economic and demographic variables. In this paper, all these interdependencies are taken into account.
A new, hybrid, climate-energy-economy model has been developed to analyse the complex geographical and intertemporal interactions of the main socio-economic, technological and climatic variables. This is WITCH (Bosetti, Carraro, Galeotti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2006) , a climate-energy-economy model in which a bottom-up specification of the energy sector is fully integrated into a top-down intertemporal optimisation model of the world economy. The model accounts for interdependencies and spillovers across 12 regions of the world. Therefore, optimal strategies are the outcome of a dynamic game through which inefficiencies induced by global strategic interactions can be assessed. In WITCH, technological progress in the energy sector is endogenous, thus enabling us to account for the effects of different stabilisation scenarios on induced technical change. Feedbacks from economic variables into climatic ones, and vice versa, are also accounted for in the model dynamic system. This paper addresses the above questions from an economic viewpoint by using a model in which future technological scenarios are carefully modelled. The objective of this paper is therefore twofold. On the one hand, it will present the main features of the WITCH model. On the other hand, thanks to the new features of WITCH, it will provide some novel insights into the costs of climate change control and into the optimal strategies to achieve it.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a concise description of the WITCH Model. For a thorough presentation of the model, the interested reader is referred to . Section 3 presents our main results on the costs of stabilising GHG atmospheric concentrations and on the related energy R&D and investment strategies. Section 4 analyses the implications of these optimal strategies for the price of emission permits in a global permit market. Section 5 provides a deeper analysis of some specific issues: the role of R&D expenditure, the effects of a backstop technology and the economic implications of carbon capture and sequestration. A concluding section summarises our main results.
The WITCH model
WITCH is a regional integrated assessment model designed to provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to climate damages and to model the channels of transmission of climate policy into the economic system (see Bosetti, Carraro, Galeotti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2006 derives from energy R&D investments in each region through an innovation possibility frontier characterised by diminishing returns to research, a formulation proposed by Jones (1995) and empirically supported by Popp (2002) for energy-efficient innovations. As social returns of R&D are found to be higher than private returns in the case of R&D, the positive externality of knowledge creation is accounted for by assuming that the return on energy R&D investment is four times higher than the one in physical capital (Nordhaus, 2003) . At the same time, the opportunity cost of crowding out other forms of R&D is obtained by subtracting four dollars of private investment from the physical capital stock for each dollar of R&D crowded out by energy R&D. We assume new energy R&D crowds out half of the other R&D investments, as in Popp (2004) .
For a thorough discussion of model calibration the interested reader is referred to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2006) .
The Cost of Stabilising GHG Atmospheric Concentrations
Two stabilisation targets have been considered in our analysis of stabilisation strategies and of the related costs. In the first one, optimal investments and R&D strategies are targeted to stabilise In the BAU scenario, future values of all economic variables are close to those observed in the past thirty years. Baseline emissions almost double in 30 yrs time, due to increasing population and improving lifestyles; this increase is partially compensated by a looser economy-energy interdependence, but not by an energy-carbon decoupling. The definition of the baseline has important implications in terms of efforts required to stabilise the climate (and therefore in terms of stabilisation costs). In this respect, the reproduction of history -at least over short time horizons -provides a useful benchmark.
In the 550 ppm scenario, the reduced emissions growth mainly stems from energy efficiency improvements as testified by the further decrease of energy intensity (Δ EN/GDP column), although some decarbonisation of energy is also needed. A more fundamental change of picture is required in the 450 ppm scenario. Keeping carbon concentrations below this target can be achieved only if both energy intensity and carbon content of energy are significantly decreased. Notice that in both the 450 and 550 ppm stabilisation scenarios, the GDP loss arising from the effort of stabilising GHG concentrations is fairly small. This issue will be discussed at length below. As for the distribution of effort between the OECD and Non-OECD countries, this depends on the allocation scheme considered. Even if we assume a burden-sharing agreement on the basis of evenly balanced emissions per person -the so-called equal per capita scheme -we can see from Table 1 that improvements of energy efficiency are larger in Non-OECD than in OECD countries.
Developing countries reduce the energy intensity of their economies by roughly 70% in order to keep emissions at present levels. This shows the increasing relevance of the developing world in contributing to control global carbon emissions. On the other hand, OECD countries improve their performance in terms of energy decarbonisation, given the higher energy efficiency standards and capacity to invest in capital intensive technologies with low carbon emission factors.
Figure 2 provides some additional interesting information on the temporal modifications of the energy sector, as it plots the evolution of energy intensity and carbon content of energy throughout the 21st century. The BAU scenario is characterised by a further improvement of energy intensity, which continues a phenomenon observed in the past decades. However, it envisages a slight carbonisation of energy over the century: although small, this effect reflects the increasing share of coal in the energy mix in the absence of an effective climate policy (this is also consistent with the Energy Information Administration's medium term projections; see EIA, 2007) . This increase is mostly driven by the growing energy consumption of developing countries. As for the stabilisation scenarios, the 550 ppm scenario calls for an improvement in energy intensity beyond the noclimate policy one, and eventually for energy decarbonisation. The 450 ppm scenario requires further advancements in both directions, and especially towards a production of carbon-free energy. The expansion of nuclear energy is particularly relevant in the 450 ppm scenario. Nuclear energy would eventually guarantee about 50% of total electricity production, a 10 fold increase in the quantities of electricity generated. Let us stress that this result is not a prediction, but rather a normative conclusion. It is achieved on the basis of cost minimising strategies in all regions of the world and does not reflect concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. External costs induced by nuclear plants -e.g. the cost of waste disposal -are instead accounted for.
Clearly the capacity deployment of such a contentious technology to the levels suggested by our optimisation exercises would raise additional questions, to the point that the feasibility of a nuclear-based scenario would ultimately rest on the capacity to radically innovate the technology itself as well as the institutions controlling its global use. For these reasons, we have also explored a scenario in which the use of nuclear energy is limited by environmental and political concerns and where a carbon-free "backstop" technology -that can be made economical via targeted R&D investments -may displace nuclear plants. Such a currently unavailable technology can be thought of as a bunch of innovative green power generation devices or as a new nuclear technology based on nuclear fission (see Figure 14 below and Section 5 of this paper, for a discussion of the economic implications of this scenario).
In any case, the relevant changes in the energy sector induced by the adoption of a stabilisation target are likely to come at a cost. The shift towards nuclear and solar energy and the use of carbon capture and sequestration are likely to induce non negligible economic costs. Assumptions on the potential penetration of nuclear or of alternative backstop technologies are also key in defining the total cost of stabilising GHG concentrations. Additional costs come from the R&D expenditure which is necessary to achieve the aforementioned improvement in energy efficiency. By contrast, positive effects on world economies may be induced by lower climate damages and by the revenues arising from the sale of permits (for regions that are permit sellers). The distribution of these costs strictly depends on how the overall burden is allocated across regions. If permits are allocated according to the equal per capita criterion, OECD countries bear a larger cost than Non-OECD countries. The opposite holds if permits are allocated according to the sovereignty criterion.
In this latter case, Non-OECD countries would pay for most of the stabilisation cost. A feasible compensation policy is analysed in Bosetti, Carraro, Massetti and Tavoni (2007) .
Total net present value costs, and their disaggregation for OECD and Non-OECD countries, are shown in Table 2 . Policy cost figures are provided for the two allocation strategies and for the two stabilisation targets. They are expressed in net present value terms (the inter-temporal discount rate is the one used in the optimisation runs, i.e. 3% declining at 0.25% per annum 5 ). The last row of each table shows total stabilisation costs in the case in which nuclear energy is constrained to present levels, and a backstop technology is available. Notice how, in the 550 ppm scenario, costs are almost negligible (0.2% of GDP), whereas they visibly increase in the 450 ppm case (3.6% of GDP). This cost difference between the two scenarios is a direct consequence of the different magnitude of the energy sector modifications in the 550 ppm as opposed to the 450 ppm case. It also stems from the acknowledged non-linearity of marginal abatement curves. The 450 policy requires drastic cuts in emissions, especially in the second half of the century, when emissions are stabilized at around 3GtC/yr. With growing economies and population, this entails a significant increase in energy costs, particularly as the mitigation gets more and more stringent. The effect of temporal discounting is partially compensated by the growing size of the economic activity. The benefits of avoided climate damages are visible but not very significant given the relatively conservative assumptions of Nordhaus' damage function; costs gross of climate change increase to 0.6% and 4.2% for the 550 and 450 ppm respectively.
Constraining nuclear at present levels is shown to increase stabilisation costs to a limited extent if we expect that a backstop technology will enter the market during the next decades; costs are very large otherwise. Therefore, there is a trade-off between nuclear external costs (e.g. waste management) and the R&D investments needed to induce technological change in the power sector. For a detailed analysis of backstop technology and innovation uncertainty in the context of GHG stabilisation, see .
Let us look at how the burden of stabilising GHG concentrations is shared among different regions of the world. Our results confirm the contrasting implications of equal per capita and sovereignty allocation schemes, with the former imposing a higher relative contribution on OECD countries, whereas the latter more on Non-OECD countries, and also more unequally. As expected, except for some small income effects, aggregated stabilisation costs are very similar for the two allocation schemes, as the international permit market equalises marginal abatement costs globally. If compared with other cost estimates proposed in the literature, the undiscounted stabilisation costs in 2030 obtained using the WITCH model stand in the middle of the latest IPCC ranges (See Table 3 ). However, the IPCC median value is lower than our cost estimate, especially for the 450 7 EPC=Equal per Capita, SOVRG=Sovereignty ppm scenario, even though in WITCH technical change is endogenous and stabilisation induced effects on technological progress are accounted for. This gap somewhat widens over time: for example, in 2050, WITCH cost estimates for the 450 scenario are about 3 times higher than the IPCC median and the value suggested by Stern (2007) . They are however lower than MIT IGSM, but 50% higher than those provided by MERGE and MINICAM (U.S. CCSP 2007).
One of the main reasons behind our result is that WITCH explicitly takes into account global externalities and the resulting inefficiencies. That is, contrary to most climate-economy models, our baseline is a second-best solution generated by a dynamic game that captures all regions' freeriding incentives on global externalities such as CO 2 , exhaustible resources, knowledge spillovers, etc.. Indeed, when we compute the total stabilisation cost by maximising the world welfare -a first best solution as opposed to the Nash equilibrium -the gap between our policy costs estimates and the IPCC median is halved. It is therefore clear that free-riding incentives arising from public goods externalities impose extra costs that are especially important for ambitious targets (the 450 ppm scenario) where the mitigation effort is much larger and the required changes in the energy sector with respect to the BAU scenario are more relevant.
The Carbon Permit Market
In our scenarios, the main economic policy instrument that is used by the governments of all regions to stabilise GHG emissions is a global market for emission permits. Even though this may not be realistic in the short term, it may be a good approximation of future policy scenarios. In this section, we also assume an equal per capita allocation of initial allowances and global participation from the first stage of the dynamic game. 8 Figure 6 shows the dynamics of the permit price in the two stabilisation scenarios. The sharp difference between the 550 and the 450 ppm scenarios emerges again. The 450 ppm target is more costly and this is reflected in the equilibrium permit price (an indicator of the stringency of the target). In 2030, a ton of CO 2 is priced about 25$ and 100$ in the two scenarios 9 : such a fourfold ratio is needed to achieve a mitigation effort of 30% and 50% respectively, thus confirming the non-linear relation between costs and abatement. These figures are in line with those estimated using top-down models in the IPCC-4AR-WGIII (Table SPM. 2). The price of carbon, however, keeps growing at a constant pace, thus increasing considerably over time, although this is partially compensated by the continued world economic growth. This path is aligned with high range 8 In a companion paper we analyse the implications of different allocations of allowances and of different participation strategies of developing countries. In particular, different time profiles of participation decisions are investigated. 9 Throughout the paper we refer to constant 1995 USD.
estimates in the U.S. CCSP 2007, and reflects the increasing abatement cost in the absence of a technological breakthrough. As noted in the previous section, the extra-costs of overcoming countries' free-riding behaviour is an additional obstacle to cost reductions. The price of carbon equalises the world marginal abatement cost, and thus ultimately depends on the assumptions on carbon mitigation options. Accounting for additional emissions reductions measures, for example in the agriculture and forestry sector, would decrease the costs of complying with the two targets. For instance, Tavoni, Songhen and Bosetti (2007) show that total abatement costs computed by WITCH are halved when including abatement options in the forestry sector.
The volumes traded in the carbon market are shown in Figure 7 (positive values indicate buying, negative values show selling). In a 550 stabilisation scenario, almost 60 GtC (an average of 0.6 GtC/yr, 10% of current emissions) are traded over the next century, a figure that goes down to 35 GtC in a 450ppm scenario, where the more stringent target requires more domestic action to abate GHG emissions. Therefore, there would be more emission trading in the less ambitious abatement scenario. Similar remarks concern the learning-by-doing effects characterising renewable energy and in particular solar and wind energy (see Figure 11) . Again, the 450 ppm target can be achieved only in the presence of important reductions in the unit cost of energy produced using solar or wind power plants. These cost reductions can be achieved only if technical improvements associated with an increase of the installed capacity are sufficiently large. should be injected (in accordance with the IPCC 4AR WGIII). However, the use of this technology should decrease over time in the 450 scenario relatively to the 550 one. The reason is that a more stringent target calls for a relatively greater deployment of very low carbon technologies; renewables and nuclear are thus progressively preferred to CCS, because this latter technology is characterised by a higher emitting factor 13 . Advances in the capacity to capture CO 2 at the plant (assumed at 90%) would increase CCS competitiveness, though this could be counterbalanced by potential leakage from reservoirs.
13 Constraining the potential deployment of nuclear and renewables would offset this effect. It may be argued that our results are conditional on one crucial assumption: the optimal intertemporal investment decisions are taken with respect to the existing energy technologies (and their improved efficiency), but no breakthrough technological change is considered for the energy sector. This is why we checked the robustness of our conclusions with respect to the possible emergence of a new technology in the electricity sector (e.g. a new solar or a new nuclear technology). The basic assumption is that there exists a carbon-free power generation technology, at present uneconomical, whose unit price can be diminished by investing in dedicated R&D. More specifically, the investment cost of building a unit of power capacity ($/kW) depends on cumulated R&D via a power formulation governed by the learning parameter. Starting from a present high investment cost (6000$/kW), we analyse whether there is the incentive to undertake these investments (in R&D but also in installed capacity to enhance the learning-by-doing effect).
New power generation shares are shown in Figure 14 , which suggests that the backstop technology replaces mostly "old" nuclear energy (i.e. produced with existing technologies) as the main energy source. Most importantly, it shows that the 450 ppm target provides the incentives to invest in R&D and to develop an economically efficient backstop technology.
By comparing Figures 4 and 14 , it can be noticed that renewables are not crowded out by the backstop technology, whereas fossil fuels are completely phased out by the end of the century. Finally, Figure 15 shows the optimal amount of R&D investments that are necessary for the backstop technology to penetrate the market. Again most investments must be undertaken soon, 
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the economic implications of stabilising GHG concentrations over the next century. Climate change is widely perceived as one of the most pressing environmental issues, and many countries are moving towards the implementation of carbon mitigation targets and agreements. As a consequence, the analysis of economically optimal strategies that stabilise GHG concentrations at non-dangerous levels has become an important research objective, as testified by the large number of studies and the research efforts evaluated by the IPCC WG III.
The previous sections of this paper have presented our quantitative assessment of GHG stabilisation policy. This has been performed using WITCH, an energy-economy-climate optimisation model based on a game-theoretical set up. The model is designed to carry out normative analysis of climate policy, i.e. to identify the optimal investment profiles in the energy sector and in R&D that achieve a pre-determined carbon concentration target. In this analysis, the role of both global externalities and of induced technological change has been accounted for.
Our results show that the stabilisation of CO 2 concentrations at 550 and 450 ppm is feasible, but requires radical changes in the energy sector and large investments in R&D. Both energy efficiency and decarbonisation of energy production should improve.
The required changes in energy investment profiles and R&D efforts imply some costs.
According to our estimates, global GDP losses in 2030 would be equal to 0.4% if the 550 ppm target is to be attained, and to 1.2 % in the case of the 450 ppm stabilisation target. Total discounted costs over the next century would be 0.3% and 2.1 % of global GDP respectively.
While well within the range identified by the IPCC, the higher median stabilisation cost estimated by WITCH, compared with IPCC, largely depends on the free-riding incentives that arise from the global public nature of the carbon and R&D externalities and on the consequent inefficiencies.
In our scenario, the stabilisation of GHG concentrations is achieved by implementing a global permit market. Therefore, we have been able to provide some information on the dynamics of this market and on how the mitigation burden is shared among different countries. As expected, burden-sharing depends on how the global target is allocated among the different world regions.
An equal emission per capita criterion favours developing countries and can thus be used as a tool to enhance participation incentives.
Finally, our analysis sheds some lights on the large investments that are necessary in the energy sector to achieve the improvements in energy and carbon intensity required by GHG stabilisation. We have shown how fossils fuels will be gradually phased out and how other energy sources may emerge in the next decades. We have also been able to quantify the role of carbon capture and storage and the expected dynamics of renewable energy sources. Special attention has been devoted to the role of R&D. If ambitious abatement targets have to be achieved, large investments in R&D (four times the current levels) would be necessary to improve existing energy technologies and/or to foster the development of new ones.
